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Significant rearrt de<1dopmmts in Altstrfllian arl tducation kt'rot mooed 
tr..oay from II corrsidertltion of lhe aesthmc value of fine art products to a l1rr:ltIJf 
sociological corruption of tht visualllTfs which includes jolk and pt?PU1Dr arts. 
Many art tduaators IJSS1lmt' II ~lly functi01U1list a~ which ~tes 
cullural diDtTSity and attempts to describt. the functicm of cultural IITtijtlcts, 
somdintes in tmns oj liotd apnienCL Whilt acbrowledging the ~ of 
thesttiaJdopmmts, th~author ~ Iht?itul t~ OlItvntl productyon IS pari of 
an unjust socidyin jt:rme:rrt and IS a51.teof idmlogical strvgg~ The~~.ct.d 
is thnt wbt tnlt tOitssuUjed, ari educatiOn must JJdopta.sociallycnti~1 posttum. 
Dnr.uing upcm tMcultumlist tendency within E.nglishC~Itural StudfCS, passibk 
thmrttiall foundi2tions for a socUtIly ential ari ed~hon are ~~ 
include: ~l stnu:tllr~ is as importon' as liml trpenm«; 50CItty IS ~
of rompm"g inttTeSts and is strvduml in domi~c:r. CUlhtraI produ:non 1$ 
ronstih4tTw of social mility; basic to human adJ~ l.~ llSEnCJ' c:onstrmnt IUId 
struggl~and apliritlymgaged jwdpmt isessmfial tothttUvdopmmt o{Q maR' 
dmurnilic soddy. 
Thedemocraticimpulse atwork within the ~ustralian ~tituteof ~ 
Education reflects a collective motive and a genume commJtment ~o pnn-
ciples derived from no less than deepl~ engrained.cultur.aJ expectations. It 
is perhaps not surprising to find that m our officiaJ pohcy ~tatem~ts we 
adopt explicitly democratic approaches ~<! art and art education. We argue 
against competitions in favour of exhtbltlons (1987); and we propose that 
the visual arts should be broadly conceived to indude not only fine a:rt,. but 
the folk and popular arts (1984). Our practice,. h~eve.l;.marnot accurate!y 
retied our rhetoric.. Not all of us have the trauung orexpenena to echo lR 
practice our stated intentions, but our in!entions at least. art dear. U. we take 
seriously the endorsement of our policy statem~nts by the vanous ~ 
teacher organiz.ations around the country, Aus~lian. art e~ucators, at ~ 
time in history strongly support a broadly conceIVed.. mdusIYe, democratiC 
approach to the visual ~ 
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Cultural Pluralism 
Among the many pressures for this position nOI least has bem a 
searcn for relevance. By defining OUf subject as the aestl'lttic, we long ago 
condemned ourselves to a marginal role within education, a position that 
merely echoes the marginal role of aesthetic considerations. within sodll!'ty. 
This marginality is speUed out each year at A.LA.E. conferences, state by 
state.. 
A search for relevance has led to the consideration of students' own 
tastes, attitudes, and beliefs. Increasingly, we have become aware of the 
need to be sensitive to students" own ways of life in ill society stratified by 
economic dass.es and compris.ed of numerous ethnic groups {Boughton. 
1983}. Both here and overseas the acknowledgements of a multicultural 
s.ociety has led to calls for visual art education to be broadly understood; to 
indude, potentially, all visual artifacts through whlch people make mean· 
ing. Robert 8ersson (1983) calls for an art education that acknowledges 
"pluralism. diversity, variety. difference. . . the full range of visual culture" 
(p. 29). Calls are made for a sociocultural curriculum. a sodological 
curriculum. and a sodal studies approach (Nadanet;. 1985; Chapman. 1978; 
Chalmers. 198:J}. Edmund Feldman (1982) calls for an anthropolOgical 
orientation. Laura Chapman (1978) writes of the need for an educators to 
be willing to talk · about life, not JUSt art" (p. 99) and G raeme Chalmers 
(1985) writes of the need .. to focus on,. meaning rather than the perception 
of form" (p. 281 ). 
The shift of focus. can be captured by examining a story told by 
Vmcent Lanier (1987) in hl:. Lwn Jackman Memorial t..eaure last yeae. 
Lrnier argues that aesthetic experience is not peculiar to art. certainly not to 
fine art. and need not, as isoften claimed, have high moral associations.. Yet 
his framework remains aesthetic. He writes: 
I myself have an aes.thetic response I am not proud 
of and cannot explain. Manyyears ago. Out oldest 
son brought back for me from a trip to England a 
sm.all ceremonial dagger in a metal sheath. On the 
black handgrip is an enamelled red swastika. on.a 
white field and on the blade is engraved Blut und 
EJ\re, theGmnanfor Blood and Honow;. the motto 
of the 5.S. As an unrepentant anti-Nazi of World 
War 2 vintage. I stand behind no one in my hatred 
of the Third Reich. Yet I must confess I think that 
daggeris beautiful; hombly beautiful. but beautifu.l 
nonetheless (p. 16). 
Lanier is perhaps the fathtt of a socially critical art education (1969), 
but since nis avowo!d interest here is aesthetic, though ne knows more, his 
response is divided He is unable to reconcile his aesthetic response to his 
knowledge of the wider social context By contrast., Chalmer' s concern. and 
mine, would be in the whole meaning of the daggel;. aesthetic and other· 
wise; indeed. in this case, the tension between the aesthetic and the context 
Many art educalOrs today profess concern for meaning.. not just aesthetics.. 
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And they are inleNSled in the meaning artifacts hav.e for stud~nts. nol just 
connoisseurs.. Pat Brady (1986) calls for an art cumculum of the human 
social condition" (p. 61). ~ reply!o. a.quote offered by Ralph Smi~ (1986) 
as a paradigm of aesthetic sensltrvlty. Brady argues that a legitimate 
response could be " Merde!!!· (p. 60). . 
On what basis are we now to proceed? Havmsopm.~ thfl" sdlool-
room door to allow in the plethora of cultural products previously locked 
outside. what dowe do? How do we dfl"al with the diverse and often d«~ly 
disturbing cultural products that etisL While we ha~e learnt to deal WIth 
Monet aesthetically and Van Gogh in terms of expresslVen~. ~hat ar:e ,,:,e 
todowith teltvi.sionsoaps. t«n magazines, supermarket pamtings. Wlth iI-
lustrationson the back of area1 packets and bubble ~ w:appers? How 
are we todea1 with the kinds of cultural expmentt WIth which most of our 
students art most familiar? We have recognised the issue of cu1tural 
diversity; how art we now to deal with if? 
Mostofthe art educators I have mentioned aschampions of an open-
door policy to the visua1 arts are theoretically indebted to functionalist 
sociofogy and functional anthropology. Chapman (1973) ~akes her ~p­
proach dear in advocating the study of artifacts in terms of p.ured OPPOSItes 
like traditional and innovative. Feldman (1982) would study cu1tura1 
artifacts as bearers of themes common to all humanity; birth. death. grief; 
and rites of passage lik! marriage. . . 
The end p roduct of this approach is descnpt.iOn. 11 s~eks to make 
students aware of their own participation "''ith the \'lSual arts In a way that 
relates their participation to others in time and place. In this, the approach 
responds toCleeply felt pressures.. As the anthropolOgISt Braudy (1982.) has 
written. 
The pre..occupation with the present,. the search 
for patterns and the exposure of its images . : _ is 
historically associated with periods when the Signs 
are unclear and cultural classification becomes the 
primew.ytogetcontrolovern'enlS(pp. 484-485). 
By exercising the control of interpretation. art ~ucators would place 
themselves, and invite their students. to stand outside the ch.aos. They 
assume that if they can describe what is going on they have at least some 
measure of power over it The desire to impart such power;. such control. 
appears to me wholly commendable. The desire to better understand the 
lived experience of students appears equally commenda~le. The ~eed to 
mak! art education relevant and vi tal to students goes Wlthout saymg. 
Yet the approach is, I want to suggest,. serio~l)' fta~ed:- It is .not 
enough to describe social function as if standing?utslde .Iookin!?m. Socie!y 
is at least not only a functioning organism. It is hierarchic. stratified and,. m 
many wa)'S, unjust; and wh.aMver e.lse the .visu~ arts may bto they ar!t ItSsen-
tiall}' an integral part of such a sooety. Smct ther are part of .a.slTu~e to 
make meaning in an unjust society, a hierarchIc an~ sn:-atified SOCIety. 
int\'itably they are bound to issues of power and dormnation. 
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I agree with Lanier(1976) when he writeselsnvhere of arts education: 
What is required is a critical consciousness, an 
informed awareness of the social forces whkh 
oppress our lives, confine our growth. and ddinc 
our dreams, and an additional awareness of what 
we can do to combat them ... to clarify the ways in 
which the socia.\,. political and economic worlds 
work. and how it can be improved (p. 20). 
I agrH with Gerry King (1981) who calls for an art education that is 
"issues conscious· becausethatis th!t way art is. I agr«with Landon Beyer 
(1984). who calls for an art education that interprets rulture in ways that 
"puts it at the centre of soda1 conduct and ethical deliberations" (p. 8).. 
Foundations for a Socially Critical Position 
I will attempt to lay before you several theoretical foundations upon 
which a socially critical art education could be built. an art education 
prepared to address not only the sociaI1y embedded nature of its subject,. but 
its political nature. In developing a socially critical position, I will be 
keeping in mind the two competing positions I have alreadymentioned: the 
cultural-pluralist approach. many of us now advocate. and the aesthetic 
orientation many of us. in one form or another;. still practitt. 
The foundations J will offer are not exclusive. Other approaches are 
available, and all are constantly being revised.. I will not be translating the-
ory into classroom practice; that work ~mains to be done. The kind of 
theoretical ideas I will be drawing upon have bHn developed largely for 
literature and the media. not for art education. Whert they might l!tad us 
in the classroom I cannot yet say. Hen, 1 will s«k only to outline some 
general prindples. 
In the spirit of the intellKtua1 tradition from which I will be coming 
let me spell out what that tradition is. Let me lay mycatds on the table; that 
way I will be a stationary target. I wiD bto drawing upon wha t has b«n called 
the culturalist tendency within contemporary Cultural Studies in England. 
This is a network ofideas that owes a major debt tovarious Marxist theorists 
and. indeed. has been a significant contributor to a new, complex Marxism.. 
In particular. 111 be drawing upon the ideas of Raymond WIlliams (1958; 
1961 / 65; 1977; 1979; 1981; 1983). E. P.Thompson (1962a; 1962b; 1963), Stuart 
Hall (197J; 1980; 1982). Terry Eagleton (1983). and Rich.ard Johnson (1979). 
including their interpretations of continental theoreticians, notably Anto-
nio Gramsci. Mikhail Bakhttn. and Michel Foucault. 
What I will be offering is not a coherent body of knowledge, not a 
single theory. but a number of intersecting themes, a stt of interwoven 
proposals. As ideas about society and human action some will seem 
unremarkable, though used as the basis for thinking about cultural prod. 
ucts they can have far reaching co~uences.1 
16 Duncum 
Social Structure and Lived Experience 
The first foundation I "'ish to propose is that there needs to be as 
much stress on social structure as on lived experience. On the one hand. 
studying cuJturf' means tn try tn understand how.cultural products are 
generated and used ""rithin the context of people's lives. ~e needs to be 
sensitive to s tudent's 0 ...... '11 meanin~, beliefs and valu~ ~ far many of 
us are now prepared to go_ But going only s.o fa: meanslgnonng the wider 
context of the social structure in which expenences are had. As well as 
responsiveness to lived experience we nee~ t~e scale of a theory concerned 
with the social world as a whole_ aturalistlc approaches take us on1y so 
far. From a Marxist position, experiential accounts of culture disre.gard the 
ever-present possibility of false consciousness and the ~'er of ~al struc· 
tures to ope-rate behind our backs Oohnson,l919). And thiS appbesasmuch 
to the fine arts as it does to television. 
When we gaze at a Monet haystack bathed in warm ahemoon li&:ht, 
perhaps we are overwhelmed by the loveliness of ~e col_ours, or like 
Kandinskv (1964) claimed.. transported into another dlmenslo": Pe~aps 
the only response we wish to make is aesthetic. F\)litlcal con~derations 
seem irrelevant, intrusive, even tasteless. Of course, there are times when 
all we want to say about an artifact is Mhow beautiful.'" . Howevet Il!1 
educated response is at least aware of the pressures that drive one to thIS 
position.. and as educators it is incumbent upon us to make those pressu~ 
visible to our students. 
We should be cognizant that thc notion of aesthetic experience. l~e 
our modem conception of fine art, was a direct response to the Industrial 
Revolution; and that the emergence of these concepts ",,"as h?~~d dosely to 
the emergence of culture as the cultivation of a refined senSIbility and later 
the works of such refinemenl We should recaU that these developments 
occurred In response to the ugliness of industry, to a general social empha-
sis on utilitv, but also, to calls for democracy by the new proletarian class 
oppressed by their industrial masters (Vl"llliams, 1958, 1983). We should re· 
member that the honoured place afforded aesthetic sensitivity, of refined 
taste, has often been used as a weapon in the class war in~ugurated by the 
Industrial Revolution. We should be aware, and make It known to our 
students that we are all heirs of the tndustrial Revolution, all subject to the 
social dYnamiCS that arose at that time; to the split cons.ciousness between 
art and industr)~ the aesthetic and utility, high culture and mass culture, the 
culture of the elite and the culture of the so-<alled mob. And we should 
never forget that these distinctions have frequently been used to check 
democratic impulses.. . . . 
The single most influential text of the high cult~ sooal mtlque, 
forever after regarded as a pinnacle of h igh culture analysIS, was Matthew 
Arnold's (1 869) Cullun!and AmJrchy. It was written in direct response toa 
riot which occurred in London's Hyde Park when police charged into pro-
testors who were calling for a widened franchise (WUliams, 1979) . . At th.e 
tum of this century, at the dawn of modernity, the single most pressmg di-
lemma facing young members of the European avant garde was. w~et~er art 
should serve the international working class movement for SOCial JustIce, or 
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whether artshould serve itseU (Shapiro, 1976). Indedding.as most did. that 
art should serve itself. they responded to the same social pressures we are 
subject to when we respond to their work with · how beautiful· and are 
prepared to leave it at that. 
Foucault advises, whenever there is talkof meaning and of goodness 
and virtue, look. for "'s tratt'git'5 of domination'" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982,. 
p. 212). Lived experience is Ilital tocultural analysis, our own as weU as our 
students, but it should never exclude considerations of social organization. 
Society Consists of Competing Interests 
Which are Structured in Dominance 
The second fo undation stone I wish to lay is that society consists of 
groups whose interests are in conflict and is structured in dominance. 
Society is not just a functioning organism. The anthropologicallliew of 
culture as a whole way of life is a false generalisation, altogether too 
impersonal and passive. It is mOre accurate to speak of a wno!e way of 
conflict, or whole ways of life (Thompson, 1%2a)_ But society is not only 
conflictual; it is, in Althusser 's phrase '" structured in dominanet" (rited in 
Hall, 1977, p. 327). Society snould be understood in terms of power and 
domination. 
To understand cultural production in such a society a concept which 
h.as proven enormously helpful i!. that of hegemony. Gr.unsci described 
hegemony as the domination of one group over another by, among other 
means. estabHshing what will count as definitions of reality. Definitions 
which are favourable to the dominant group are institutionalised in dvillife 
and the organs of the state. This includes education, the major communi-
cation systems, and the arts_ Such definitions of reality are so persuasive 
that they come to constitute the primary lived experience of subordinate 
groups.. All competing definitions of reali ty are framed within the preferred 
range of dommant groups.. This does not mean the dOminant groups are 
able ei.ther to prescribe or proscribe tne Specific consciousness of subordi-
nate groups, but dominant groups strive to bring all alternatives within 
their horizons of thoughl Consciousness is saturated to such an ~;dent that 
pressures and limits of what is actually economic, political and cultural, 
seem to most of us the pressures and limits of hum an existence and common 
sense (Williams, 1977). The interest serving nature of hegemony is thereby 
rendered invisible. By such naturalness, such taken-fo r-grantedness, ide-
ology secures consenl Ideology masquerades as common sense (Hall. 
1977). 
In a society that is structured from top to bottom. to study cultural 
products is largely to study definitions of reality acceptable to dominant 
groups. In a ruerarcbic society, to study culture is often to study how the 
ruling hegemony is produced. 
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Cultural Products ue Constitutive of Social Reality 
The third foundation I wish to propose is that cultural products 
should be regarded as constitutive of social reality. The keyword here.is 
constitutive. Culture is constitutive of social pressures and processes. socia) 
values ilnd beliefs. In proposing that culture is o;msfitutiw of £Odd 
dynamics. I am rejecting expression theory and reflection theory and all the 
other th~ries which assume culture and society to be autonomous dl). 
mains. 
In orthodox Marxism. culture WilS a reflection ofthe-socio-e-conomic 
base. In common,libe-ral parlance, culture is an expression of ~a.1 dynam-
ics. Both views are equally rejected. Instead. culturaJ production IS SHn to 
be interv.-oven with the general social order Q-Iall. 1982). as inseparably 
interacti\'ewith economic and poUtica1 processes (WIlliams. 1961 / (01- The 
inherent passivity of expression and reflection th~ry is rejected in favour 
of the view that culture is as much an ongoing contnDution to society as a. 
mere response to il Culture is seen as an active, ongoing intervention wlti~h 
helps to highlight,. exclude and frame issues; even to define what will 
constitute an issue. 
For example, research now focuses on television as only one, not 
clearly(iemilrcated influence. among other influences within society, an in-
dependent element of a whole social real ity rather thiln about social reality 
(McQuaiL 1983). The media is seen not as one thing but as offering an 
enormously diverse set of messages, images and ideas, most of whjch do not 
originate with the media themstlves. but come from society and are sent 
back to societv. Thus, visual images shouJd be regarded as an Integral pan 
of what has ~ called "the teeming forces which }ostle each other within 
the combat zone of the world" (Holquist,. cited in Kijinski.. 1987). 
I said earlier that 10 study culture is often to study how the ruling 
hegemony is produced But cultural production does not. on1y meil? 
reproducing world views; it also produces them. A paradigm for this 
analysis is language. As individuals we are bom into and shaped by 
language, but we can also actively contn"bule to the development of lan-
guage. This isat once-our socialisation and our individualisation (WUli.ams. 
1977). Similarly. we are bom into and shaped by the plethora of VISual 
images that today saturate our environment Yet we can also actively 
contribute to the development of the visual arts. W~ should not think of a 
rtified visual arts and a separate society; we shouJd think of a social art. 
I believe this point 10 be of great significance. We ntoed to ~ 
Romantic notions about the arts as highly impactful as well as behaViour-
ist notions about the media to the same effect.. On the other hand. we need 
to abandon the popular contrary notion that the arts ~ve no eff~ on 
society. Rathe~ we need to understand culture as an active generation of 
meanings as much a contribution as a response to society. As art educators 
we need to be realistic about the impact of images on soci~ty;equally, since 
our subject is an integral constitutive part of society, we cannot avoid social 
commitment. A failure to engage with sodal issues cannot be founded on 
the belief that the visual arts are passive. 
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Agency, Constraint and Struggle 
Thi~ an~ysis of culture as active is built upon a general view of 
hu~an. acnon In terms of agency, ~nstraint and struggle. To view human 
aCUon In terms of agency. constraint and struggle is the fourth foundation 
lwishto.p~~ Theimponanc~ofthis proposali'Mofold. Th~~i&a rval 
need to mdlvtduals and groups of individuals to perceive the power they 
have to make changes. There is an equal need for us to understand the 
strength. tenacity and pervasiveness of the forces with which we must 
contend. 
\iVhile we enthusiastica1ly celebrate individual achievement,. it is 
always nKessaryto r:emember that human agency operates within histori-
cally formed constraints. Engels wrote. "we make our own history our-
~tv~, but . _ . under very dennite assumptions and conditions '" (cited in 
Wtlliams, 1m. p. 85). Culture is something people make for themselves; an 
active process which is lived, not fixed, and not consumed. Culture is 
something which happens in human relations as the rtsult ofhuman agency 
(Thompson. 1962a). As Williams (1977) writes, 
Everything we see and do, the whole structure of 
our relations and insti tutions, depends finaUy on 
the effort of learning. description and communi-
cation. We create the world as we have thought 
of an being created (p. 54). 
. 'VI: ar~ not ~~rles.s. but our power IS llm.1led. The control estab-
lished by. hegemony IS very great. but it is always a struggle and usually, 
only pa~ There al~ays eJti.sts the possibility of counter hegemony; and 
always, In actual social practice there exists opposition and alternatives,. 
Cultural forms close to the general social and «anomic organisation tend 
largely to ~roduc: the .ruiir.'g hegemony. We have only to think of who 
owns teie'\llSlon statlons In thIS country to make this connection. But other 
forms of cultural production exisl Cultural forms which wert once 
dOmi";il.nt, but are .now marginaL like painting often have an alternative or 
0pposltlOn.a1 relation to dominant culture. Other cultural forms suWSt 
~ew mearungs and values, new practices and kinds of relationships (Wil-
hams, 1977). 
. !iowevn: such ~temative an~ OppositiOnal possibilities exist, by 
de~bon. only In relation to the dommanl And they are a1wavs in danger 
of 1RcO~ration. .The most challenging ideas can be rendere~{ acceptable; 
byselect1on. modification, contexrualisation. Thus, in speaking of cuJturaI 
productio~ it is onlyeve.r possible to speak of agency and expression, while 
also speakingo~ regulabonand constrainl I said earlier that society should 
be understood In terms of power and domination. and so should cultural 
production. Yet both socia.! dynamics and cultural production should also 
be viewed in terms of resistance and struggle. 
. To ~ake meamng i~ tostru~le with competing definitions of reality. 
This a,pplles wh~ther ~ne IS ~roductng a cultural product or using one. The 
murung of a VIsual unage IS modified and transformed by the variable 
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social lon5, valuations and connotations with which it is used under 
sp«ific conditions. Far from bring neutraL im.a~ art a focus for struggte 
and contradiction. Tostudy an image is to investigate its varied history as 
conflicting groups. dasses. individuals and discourses have SOughl to 
'fPropriate il and imbue it with itsown meanings... The visual arts i~ a field 
o Idwlogical contention. a sile of ideological struggle.. The mMly ID\I.~ 
produced in our society carr}'with them values and world ~ews. There ~ 
many official images which art passed off as the oruytrue Images. but the'll 
values and world views are constantly being tested· and then accepted. or 
rejected, or modified. or subverted· by the multiple interpretations of the 
various dasses. age groups. professions and ethnic and other minorities. 
Media reseaKh is now premist-d on the "resiliena and self-protec-
tive capatity of individuals. groups and even cu1tures" (McQuail. 1983. p. 
222) in dealing in compltx. negotiable and oppositional ways with media 
content Restarch focuses on audience exploitation of the media. where 
initiative and control of the media a~ often located with those who use it 
The meaning of an image is never fixed. Meaning. despite its pedigree, and 
no matter how seemingly fundamental.. is always contestable by those who 
seek toexerdse the power of interpretation for themselves.. We sh.ould l?Ok 
upon images, not as stable possessors of beauty or truth. but as Items m a 
network. of manoeuvres, tactic:s olnd techniques which serve interests. 
A Commitment to Explicitly Engaged Judgement 
The fifth foundation I wish to propose is that there should be a 
commitment to explicitly engaged judgements. Whlle cultural pluralists 
are conlent to describe and celebrate, a sociaUy critical stance is premised on 
the assumption that offering judgement is cen.tral t~ one's respons~ility 
toward the development of a more democratic soaety. U culture IS an 
instrument of power. it is naiveme-relyto descrt"be and irTesponsib.le always 
to celebrate. What is needed is a willingness to confront the hlerardUc. 
unjust, undemocratic nature of our society as manifest in cultural p roducts. 
Being an art educator should mean appraising cultural products on the 
basis of what contributes toward a genuine partidpatory democracy. 
How is judgement to be offered? A number of past practices surely 
are to be avoided We should not conflate all that is good and worthy with 
the fine arts and all that is bad with the popular arts.. The boundaries 
between these categories are ohen arbitrary; dose examination reve~ as 
many similarities as differences (Cans, 1975). It should not be categones of 
culture that count,. but the interests they serve. What is importan~ is the 
intentions of, and responses to, cultural producers, not the medium of 
communication. 
Equally, we should reject the imper1alism Qf aesthetic judgemenL 
We should avoid the kind of judgement which is ostensibly, though never 
in reality, one of detachment,. where the judgement and the judgN art' alike 
in being taken out of all their conditions and intenti.ons.. There should ~ no 
place for makingjudgements on the basis of some kind of spontaneous SlXth 
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sense where the product judged is hermetically sealed from history (Eagle. 
ton, 1983). Furthermo~, we should not merelv assume as the cultural 
pluraliSts do, that cuJtur~ fr:oducts fulfil needs.. -This is te: faU into a black 
hole ~~ cultur~ reJaf!ViSLal. FinaUy, we should avoid. as the cultural 
pluralists do not,. dissolVl~g Critidsm back into descriptive SOdology. 
. What we should do 15 to begin where the cultural pluralists leave off. 
Like the cultural pluralists we should .leapt no Q priori honOuring of 5e-lecte~ .rulturaJ forms, but rathe!; work on the assumption that pwple' s 
conditions of existe!u:e are dive~ and a wide range of cultural forms is nec-
essary to fulfil theIr n«d. to grapple with meaning. But we need to go furtb~~ We n~ to ex.anune cultural products in terms of people' s whole 
con.ditions of ex~tence; that means in terms of both liv~ experience and 
soaal s~~, tn tenns of power and domination. It also means _ this is 
an essential mgredient - descn.0ing the nature of one's engagemenL 
. Judg.ement me~ descnbingartifacts in terms of their whole condi-
.tions of ~tence whilt. also describing the conditions under whlch the 
JUdgement IS of!ered. .it IS n~ to state where one is COming from. to 
make clear o?e s relationship WIth the artifact judgfil. to make visible the 
nature of one s own ~gagemenl Engagement is, thereby; open to scrutiny 
and, thus, open ~o being contested. Ac:knowledging tht nalllre of one's 
engagement aVOIds cultural relativism; it avoids the imperialism of om-
rupotence:and It aVOIds t.h~ reduction of criticism to mere- description. 
Lamer ma~e expliCIt the nature of his engagement with the . la.zi ~agge[. ~rhaJ:"'S If we were more explicit about how our middle-dassness 
influences our Judgement of the kinds of culturaJ participation manyof our 
students pl"'efe.r, our judgements would be more h.onest. C~rta.inly thl:v 
would be more contestable, and that would be no bad thing. WilUam5 
0961 1 1965) writes that the purpose of cultural study should be 
t~ m~ the interpretation Conscious, by shOwing 
hlStoncal alternatives; to relate the interpretation 
to the particular contemporary values on which it 
rests; and. by exploring the re-a~attems of the 
wo~k. COnfronts us with the re nature of the 
chOICes we are making. . .. The more actively all 
cultural work can be re-Iated either to the whole 
organisation within which it was expressed,. or to 
the contemporary Organisation within which it is 
used, the more clearly shall we see its true va..lues 
(pp. 69-70). 
. For ~osr .'"~nce!"1'ed that such judgement takes us far from aesthetic consld~r~bons~ It IS tau- to say, while aesthetic value is no longer at centre 
stagr~ It ~ not l~ored. Not even a central focus on ideology and only a 
IDaf"gmai mterest 1R aesthetics is being suggested. Rath.el: I am advocatin 
an mterco~ected ensembleof~on~iderations_ thrsodal, the tconontic. th~ 
psychologlC:a!. and the a~thetic • In which the aesthetic is essential 
"f!lt View of aesthetic value adopted here is tar broader than the usual con~epIjO~ o.f the fine, ~a u~1 and vital. It is expanded to include, not only 
thr tntensifying. the heJghterung, but sense activity in general- the dulling. 
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th~ lulling. th~ chiming and the overbearing. Analysis will show where the 
orchestration of such genenl ~ry phenomena stimulates, reinforces 
and extends meanin~ and values in intense, ev~n irreplaceable ways. But 
analysis ..... ill also show where sensory means aid th~ evasion of other 
important human experiences.. This needs to be of at least equal concern. 
Lanier 's story about the Nazi dagger makes the point, Rambo.type films 
make the point; pornograf,hy makes the point. the presentation of the news 
makes the point Even te evision programmlng makes the point 
Conclusion 
Let me draw together the threads of tltis address.. 1 am interested in 
an art education which aCknowledges pluraliSm. but is not unoitical of it; 
that is accepting of li\ted experience, our own as well as our students', but 
is ~uaUY' conscious of how lived experience is framed by how society is 
structured. I am interested in an art education which recognises that to 
focus on meaning is to do so in an unjust. stratified society; that is aware thai 
concentrating on the human social condition means to acknowledge as 
central d imensions power and inequali ty. I am interested in an art educa· 
tion that is open to both consummatory experience and self-expression. but 
is conscious from where such concerns derive and resists allowing such 
pressures to dominate. I am interested in an art education that is as much 
concerned with power as aesthetics. an art education that would place 
aesthetic value back into its ltistorical pressures and sodaI processes.. The 
kind of art education which I seek to support is not passive or reactive, but 
proactive; indeed, Interventionary. To celebrate cultural diversity is fine; 
certainly preferable to a narrow aesthetic interest in the fine arts. Cultural 
pluralism is at least democratic. but it is a soft kind of democracy; one 
without any fight in it The art education I seek plays its part in challenging 
undemocratic rractices and is characterised by struggle, an inevitabl~ 
consequence 0 being at the centre of social issues and ethical considera· 
tiORS. 
• This essay was presented as the 8th AnnlU21 Lmn Jad:man Mtr1lOl'Uil 
Ltdtm and first appeared in Austmlian Art Eduailion, August J 988, Vol ) 2-
No. 2,. 6-13. It has been ~formatted and published with the author 's 
permission. 
Footnotes 
I . For a more comprehensive survey of these proposals, and others, 
see Duncwn (1987.1). For an indication ot how these proposals may effect 
art education see Ouncum (1987b). 
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